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BOOK REVIEW
INNOVATION, THE STATE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE:
A CORPORATE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE
BY CHARLES M. YABLON1
Reviewing
The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths,
by Mariana Mazzucato (Anthem Press rev. ed. 2014)
Is the federal government primarily responsible for the
foundational innovations that transform industries and promote economic
growth? In her important new book,2 Mariana Mazzucato, whose field is
the "economics of innovation,"3 makes precisely that claim.4 Mazzucato
details how the "entrepreneurial state" has made the critical investments
in technologies that have given rise to multi-billion dollar industries.5
Shattering contemporary stereotypes of perennial governmental
incompetence with technology (remember the Obamacare website?) she
describes how the United States government was the driving force
behind such path-breaking and ultimately highly profitable innovations
as the Internet, the various technologies incorporated into the iPhone, and
the mapping of the human genome.6 She also offers an economic
framework for understanding investment in innovation that shows why
such extensive government involvement is necessary.7 Mazzucato
argues that only the State has the funds and incentives necessary to
finance the earliest and most important phases of the innovation
process—investments that the private sector cannot and will not make.8

1
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I wish
to thank Michael Burstein and the participants in the 2015 National Business Law Scholars
Conference for their helpful comments. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the
Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance at Cardozo. Finally, special
thanks to the editors of the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, who went far beyond the
usual proofreading and editing of this piece to provide real and valuable research assistance,
only some of which involved citations to their own journal.
2
MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (rev. ed. 2014).
3
Mazzucato "holds the RM Phillips chair in the Economics of Innovation" at the
University of Sussex. Short Bio, MARIANA MAZZUCATO, archived at https://perma.cc/DUJ66AWU (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
4
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 73-110.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 21-22.
8
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 21-22, 24.
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Key to Mazzucato's argument is the idea that truly foundational
innovation is characterized by extreme and pervasive uncertainty such
that private investors cannot make reasonable calculations of risk and
return and therefore will not make optimal investments in innovation.9
The State, however, operating under a different set of concerns and
incentives, is willing to make such critical investments even when the
costs are substantial and the chances of success indeterminate.10 Her
book is therefore a powerful counterargument to all those who argue for
only minimal state involvement in fostering economic growth.11
Mazzucato's defense of the centrality of government sponsorship
of innovation is simultaneously a critique of the role of private
entrepreneurs in the innovation process.12 Under Mazzucato's theory,
private entrepreneurs, even the vaunted venture capitalists of Silicon
Valley, are necessarily latecomers to the innovation process.13 Their
business model depends on diversification, and diversification requires a
reasonable estimation of the risk/return relationship of any potential
business investment. Accordingly, they cannot operate successfully with
the deep uncertainty that characterizes investments in foundational
innovation. To be sure, Mazzucato recognizes that private capital has an
important role to play in the later stages of innovation.14 As new
technologies become better understood, the tasks of developing their
commercial applications and producing and marketing them with
maximum efficiency are all likely to be handled better by the private
sector.15 As she states, in connection with the biotech industry, the role
of the State was to "invest[] in new technology until fear-inducing
uncertainty was transformed into mere risk."16 Even in this secondary
but critical role, however, Mazzucato is highly critical of the
performance of those in the private sector, believing that they invest too
late, demand results too quickly, and expect too much in the return on
their investments.17
9

Id. at 47-50.
See id. at 62-63.
11
See id. at 73-110.
12
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 29-55.
13
See, e.g., id. at 63 (discussing how the U.S. military's defense policy of the Cold War
helped foster in the technological advancements of present-day Silicon Valley).
14
Id. at 24-25.
15
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
16
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 70.
17
Some of this critique is already explicit in Mazzucato's analysis. She criticizes the
"financialization" of American business and the "short-termism" of most contemporary
American corporate managers. See id. at 25-26. The implications of this critique for
American corporate law are not explored in her book, but are a major focus of this essay. See
infra Part II.
10
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It is here where Mazzucato's analysis becomes interesting to
corporate lawyers.
By criticizing current private investment in
innovation as sub-optimal, she raises the question whether changes to the
incentives and constraints on the managers of private capital might lead
to greater and more cost-effective innovation.18 Such concerns parallel
debates among corporate lawyers and academics about current trends in
investor activism and managerial attitudes towards risk.19 But by linking
these concerns to the economics of innovation, Mazzucato raises the
stakes in this debate. Her discussion of the interrelated roles of
government and private investment in the innovation process suggests
that by improving the rules of corporate finance and corporate
governance, we can reduce costs and optimize the overall rate of
innovation in our society.20 This intriguing idea is the subject of this
essay.
Mazzucato's account stresses that investments in innovation are
always made under conditions of uncertainty, and that private investors
fear the radical uncertainty of the early stages of the innovation process
but can handle, indeed dominate, the later stages where risks become
measurable and therefore manageable.21 Note, however, that this shift
from uncertainty to risk, while partially about the increase in knowledge
gained about the innovation through development, primarily denotes a
behavioral shift in the attitudes of investors.22 An investment in
innovation changes from "fear-inducing uncertainty" to manageable risk
at whatever point an investor feels comfortable making such an
investment.23 While developing more knowledge about the innovation is
an important factor in generating that change in investor attitude, it is not
the only factor. Whether and when an investor is willing to invest in
innovation invokes the whole panoply of incentives and constraints that
operate today on corporate executives, fund managers, and venture
18

See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 195-200.
See Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 191-92 (2015);
George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor ShortTermism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 127 (2010); Symposium, The Institutional Investor's Goals
for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 38 (2000) [hereinafter
Institutional Investor's Goals].
20
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 51.
21
Id. at 127, 193.
22
Id. at 100. Mazzucato notes that "[d]espite his strong opposition to tablet computers
in the 1980s and 1990s, upon his return to Apple in the late 1990s, [Steve] Jobs had decided
that the time was right to focus once again on tablets. Underlying this shift in perspective was
the fact that technology in semiconductor devices, batteries and displays had progressed
significantly." Id.
23
Id. at 70.
19
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capitalists.24 If corporate managers and investors are becoming more risk
averse, if they are under increasing pressure not to engage in long-term
investments with uncertain prospects, then the willingness of big firms to
finance fundamental research and the willingness of venture capitalists to
relax or vary their criteria for acceptable investments will also be
diminished.25 In short, the wrong corporate law rules may be inhibiting
the market for innovation.
Mazzucato is an economist, not a corporate lawyer.26 Her
critiques are directed at contemporary managerial and investor behavior,
and she does not address whether the source of those questionable
behaviors are to be found in law, changing market conditions, changing
investor attitudes, or a combination of all of these.27 Moreover, her
criticisms of contemporary corporate behavior are not presented
systematically but incidentally to her more basic argument, which is a
defense of substantial state intervention in the innovation process.28 This
essay seeks to pick up where Mazzucato leaves off, expanding and
developing her critique of contemporary managerial and investor
behavior with regard to innovation risk and relating it to current debates
on similar issues within corporate law.
Central to these debates is a concern that current rules and
practices involving executive compensation, managerial turnover and
investor activism may all be leading to "short termism," causing
managers to focus on short-term financial gains at the expense of longer
range development perspectives.29 Such critiques are controversial in the
24

See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 84:
Industry generally invests only in developing cost-competitive
products in the 3 to 5 year time frame. It is difficult for industry management
to justify to their shareholders the large investments in long-term, fundamental
research needed to make nanotechnology-based products possible.
Furthermore, the highly interdisciplinary nature of the needed research is
incompatible with many current corporate structures.
25
Id. at 48-49.
26
Short Bio, supra note 3.
27
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 35-62.
28
E.g., id. at 140.
29
See, e.g., Institutional Investor's Goals, supra note 19, at 44 ("No issue continues to
polarize corporations and institutional investors more than 'short-termism'—the notion that
institutional investors are only speculators or traders and will immediately sell company
management out during trading swings or for a raider's premium."); Ira Kay, Executive Pay,
Share Buybacks, and Managerial Short-Termism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/2QZY-JGGC; Thomas Palley,
Managerial Turnover and the Theory of Short-Termism, 32 J. ECON. BEHAVIOUR & ORG. 547
(1997) (discussing managerial turnover and short-termism); Mark J. Loewenstein, Making
America Competitive, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453, 469-70 (1993) (reviewing MICHAEL T.
JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA
(1991)) (discussing executive compensation and short-termism).
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corporate law literature.30 Investor activists can point to persuasive
studies that suggest that their "short-term" strategies do not lead to any
longer-term injury to shareholder value.31 Adding concerns about the
potential loss or delay of innovation, however, changes the terms of these
debates. Because foundational innovations are presumptively rare—
indeed, each one is effectively unique32—the loss of one or two is not
likely to show up in an event study of medium-range share prices.
Indeed, the event studies may well be right that most instances of
investor activism or removal of managerial protective structures do, on
average, increase shareholder value.33 But Mazzucato's book raises the
disturbing possibility that in at least some instances where pursuing longterm development strategies could lead to important innovation and
economic growth, such strategies are not being pursued due to
shareholder threats and short-term perspectives.34
This essay is divided into two parts. The first is a summary and
analysis of the argument of Mazzucato's book with an emphasis on her
account of the role of uncertainty in investment decisions regarding
innovation. It also develops and expands Mazzucato's criticism of the
current investment activities of the private sector as sub-optimal with
respect to innovation. The second section relates Mazzucato's critique to
current debates within corporate law. It begins with the basic question of
what is the purpose of corporate law itself. It shows how "dynamic"
economic models like Mazzucato's that focus on innovation and
economic growth pose a challenge to traditional "static" models of
corporate law, which emphasize efficient use of existing resources. It
then looks at concerns about the "financialization" of private investment
in innovation, relating it to contemporary corporate law debates about
short-term and long-term managerial perspectives and managerial versus
shareholder primacy models of corporate law. It asks what kind of
corporate law rules would be most likely to foster optimal private
investment in innovation and shows that these issues cannot be resolved
30

See supra note 29.
See, e.g., Hannes, supra note 19, at 195 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The LongTerm Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1088-90 (2015)).
32
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 59.
33
See, e.g., Joseph Cyriac, Ruth De Backer & Justin Sanders, Preparing for Bigger,
Bolder Shareholder Activists, CORP. FIN. PRAC., Mar. 2014, at 1, 1, archived at
https://perma.cc/8USG-QFTU ("Shareholders generally benefit. Our analysis of 400 activist
campaigns (out of 1,400 launched against US companies over the past decade) finds that,
among large companies for which data are available, the median activist campaign reverses a
downward trajectory in target-company performance and generates excess shareholder returns
that persist for at least 36 months.").
34
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 26.
31
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through empirical analysis of event studies. Such studies can give us
little insight into investments that have not been made and innovations
that have not been discovered.
This essay goes on to consider two other factors that may inhibit
investment in innovation and in which corporate law may play a part.
One is increasing conformity of investment perspectives among venture
capitalists and corporate managers. Instantaneous global communication, increased competition among venture capital and private equity
firms, the growth of shareholder activism and other factors have all
tended to create an environment in which any firm pursuing an
investment strategy currently deemed strange or unusual by the market
consensus is likely to be challenged and financially punished in various
ways. Yet the very nature of innovation is that it is likely to involve
activities viewed by most as unclear, misguided, or just plain weird.
Such activities are unlikely to conform to most financial professionals'
idea of a "good investment." This section considers ways in which
corporate law might be used to encourage investor nonconformity. The
final section deals with the undeniable fact that, from a financial point of
view, many of the most important investments in innovation, including
those that form the primary subject of Mazzucato's book, would not have
been seen as likely to be profitable. That is, financially speaking, they
were not really very good investments. This last section considers the
possibility that some investments in innovation might be made for a
combination of pecuniary and philanthropic reasons and considers how
corporate law can deal with such mixed motive investments.
I. MAZZUCATO'S THEORY OF INNOVATION: THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF
PRIVATE FINANCE AND THE STATE
Where does innovation come from? Mazzucato's answer is simple
and straightforward: nobody knows.35 The fact that nobody knows
where innovation comes from is central to her theory, and to fully
articulate that theory, she must analyze the precise ways in which our
knowledge of the sources of innovation is deficient. The framework she
uses is that of "Knightian uncertainty," the distinction among different
types of risks generally associated with Frank Knight.36 Knight used the
term "risk" for describing situations where the probability of the
occurrence of a future event can be calculated based on the distribution

35

Id. at 33-35, 58-59.
Id. at 58-59 (quoting FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233
(photo. Reprint 1964) (1921)) (explaining the difference between risk and uncertainty).
36
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of the outcomes of similar events in the past37—e.g., the probability of
rolling seven with a pair of fair dice, or the probability that a 70-year-old
male smoker in the United States will die within the next 12 months. He
contrasted these with situations where no probability can be placed on
the likelihood of occurrence of a future event because no event
sufficiently like it has ever taken place,38 like contact with space aliens or
the invention of flying cars.39 He referred to the problem of predicting
such unique events as "uncertainty" rather than "risk"40 to distinguish
between situations where we can at least know the probability of the
occurrence of an uncertain future event from those where we can know
nothing at all.41
Mazzucato argues that the sources of important, foundational
innovations are characterized by true uncertainty in the Knightian sense
and accordingly cannot be generalized about or analyzed on any
statistical basis.42 This perhaps explains the methodology of Mazzucato's
book, which consists primarily of fact-based narratives of particular
innovations and the role that various government agencies played in the

37

See KNIGHT, supra note 36, at 233 (explaining that with risk, the outcome in a group
of instances is known due to either calculations or statistics of past experiences).
38
See id. (explaining that under uncertainty, unlike risk, a group of instances cannot be
formed because the situation dealt with is unique and has not occurred before).
39
For an interesting discussion on the efforts of some to invent the flying car, see
Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 2015 WL 177434, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2015) ("The Plaintiff, in
succinct and pith-perfect fashion, stated the gravamen of his action as follows: 'If the Plaintiff
needed to sum up this entire case in one sentence, it is this: Two executives of the Disney
Company are stalling the next evolution of human transportation on this planet.' In other
words, the Defendants are holding back the flying car."), reprinted in 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 709
(2016).
40
See KNIGHT, supra note 36, at 233 (providing Knight's definition of uncertainty). In
some of his writing, Knight made a distinction between three types of predictions. The first
type involves known distributions and unknown draws, like the roll of a pair of dice or a
roulette wheel, which correspond to stochastic or classical probability. A second type involves
unknown distributions and unknown draws, which corresponds to most scientific and social
scientific studies and statistical probability. It is only the third type of prediction, defined as
non-classifiable events with non-existent distributions, that may be considered "true
uncertainty." Robert Wiltbank et al., Prediction and Control under Uncertainty: Outcomes in
Angel Investing, 24 J. BUS. VENTURING 116, 119 (2009) [hereinafter Outcomes in Angel
Investing].
41
See KNIGHT, supra note 36, at 233 (explaining the difference between risk and
uncertainty is that in the former, the probability of an occurrence can be determined, whereas
in the latter, the probability of an occurrence cannot be known). Mazzucato points out that
similar distinctions between uncertainty involving ascertainable and non-ascertainable
probabilities may also be found in the works of John Maynard Keynes and Peter Drucker. See
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 58-59 (stating differences between uncertainty and risk that
John Maynard Keynes emphasized).
42
Id. at 3, 35-36.
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development of those innovations.43 The "proof" in Mazzucato's book
that the State is the indispensable source for foundational innovation in
an economy is that, in fact, the State has been the indispensable source in
the American economy in the post-war years.44 Whether it is the
Internet, developed initially as a Defense Department project to develop
communications that could survive a nuclear attack, the transistor,
developed in the legendary Bell Laboratories cooperative venture of
government, academic, and private funding, or the mapping of the
human genome funded largely through NIH and other government grants
to the academy, Mazzucato shows that the government has played the
central role in the development of all the revolutionary technologies of
the recent past.45 By contrast, private finance has played a relatively
minor role, focusing primarily on the later stages of the innovation
process, the so-called "commercialization" of the foundational
innovation into marketable products of various kinds.46
43
Id. at 73-113 (discussing examples of several past innovations, and the government's
role in the development of those innovations).
44
Id. at xxi-xxii, 62-64, 66-67, 69-70 (discussing the government's role in past
technological innovations).
45
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at xxi-xxii, 62-64, 66-67, 69-70 (discussing the
State's role in past revolutionary technologies).
46
See id. at 21. The terms "invention," "innovation," and "commercialization" are
subject to considerable variation in meaning. A 1995 government study helpfully defined
them as follows:
Invention refers to the act of devising or fabricating a novel device,
process, or service. Invention describes the initial conception of a new
product, process, or service, but not the act of putting it to use[.] Inventions
can be protected by patents, though many inventions are not patented, and
most patents are never exploited commercially.
Innovation encompasses both the development and application of a
new product, process, or service. It assumes novelty in the device, the
application, or both. Thus, innovation can include the use of an existing type
of product in a new application or the development of a new device for an
existing application. Innovation encompasses many activities, including
scientific, technical, and market research; product, process, or service
development; and manufacturing and marketing to the extent they support
dissemination and application of the invention.
Commercialization refers to the attempt to profit from innovation
through the sale or use of new products, processes, and services. The term is
usually used with regard to a specific technology ([e.g.,] "commercializing
high-temperature superconductivity") to denote the process of incorporating
the technology into a particular product, process, or service to be offered in
the marketplace[.] The term commercialization therefore emphasizes such
activities as product/process development, manufacturing, and marketing, as
well as the research that supports them[.] More than invention or innovation,
commercialization is driven by firms' expectations that they can gain a
competitive advantage in the marketplace for a particular product, process, or
service.
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Accompanying Mazzucato's emphasis on individual innovations
and case studies of particular industries is a certain reluctance to theorize
too broadly about why the government's role has been so large in these
areas and that of private finance so small.47 In part, this is because every
major innovation is unique and Mazzucato resists making the kind of
generalizations about innovation that would be necessary to theorize
extensively about it.48 She is somewhat clearer on the theoretical reasons
why private finance plays such a small role or, as she puts it, why "[r]isk
capital is scarce in the seed stage of firm growth." 49
The short answer is that private finance hates uncertainty (in the
Knightian sense) and is not too crazy about risk either. The basic
financial strategy for reducing risk is diversification, but diversification
only works if one can make a reasonably certain determination of the
probabilities of the risks one is undertaking.50 Las Vegas casinos and life
insurance companies can be reasonably assured of a profit because they
know the odds involved in their businesses and they can set those odds in
their favor. The venture capitalist has a similar model, in that he or she
tries to invest in a portfolio of companies many of which will fail but a
In such
few of which will generate extremely high returns.51
circumstances, private equity will tend to prefer investments that are
"safer" in two different senses. First, they will prefer investments where
the risk of total failure (catastrophic loss) is comparatively low (at least
under 50%).52 Second, they will avoid investments characterized by
Knightian uncertainty, where the probabilities of success and failure
cannot be estimated to any reasonable degree.53 The result, as
Mazzucato notes, is a scarcity of private capital in the earliest stages of
innovation, and a relatively small involvement of private investors even
in the next, or early commercialization stage of development.54
As a corporate lawyer, I should point out that this reluctance to
engage with risk and uncertainty is not simply a lack of courage on the
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY 2 (1995), archived at https://perma.cc/J5R6-G38T [hereinafter OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT]; see also MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that private
finance plays a smaller role in the first phase of the invention-innovation process but plays a
larger role in the second and third phase).
47
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 86.
48
Id. at 59, 80.
49
Id. at 47.
50
Id. at 48.
51
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 47-48.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 58-59.
54
Id. at 47.
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part of venture capitalists; it may at least in part have a legal origin.
Venture capital firms have investors, to whom they usually owe various
contractual and fiduciary duties.55 Mazzucato notes this indirectly, citing
the venture capitalists' preference for relatively safer, more predictable
investments with shorter time horizons and more predictable returns.56
Venture capitalists need to establish a track record of success, not just to
bolster their own reputation and attract more investors, but also to show
that they are responsible investors who take their fiduciary duties
seriously, not wild speculators taking a flyer on long shots.57 Mazzucato
somewhat disparagingly quotes William Janeway of Warburg Pincus, a
private equity firm with substantial investments in innovative technology
firms. According to Mazzucato, Janeway "admits [he made millions by
making an investment] after the State did the hard work."58 Of course
making large returns while not doing the "hard work" (i.e. risking
substantial capital over long time horizons) might well be the definition
of a good investment. This question of whether Mazzucato and her
colleagues are essentially arguing that private investors should make
more "bad investments" is an important question, and one to which we
will return later in this essay.
Having seen the shortcomings of private finance in the innovation
cycle, we can also begin to see why Mazzucato thinks the State is
indispensable. The State has all the virtues of private capital's vices. It is
patient; it is courageous in the face of both uncertainty and great risk;
and it doesn't care all that much about profit.59 One might well ask why
investments that are considered "bad" by private investors are
nonetheless worth taking when government money is available. Looking
55

Venture capital funds are almost invariably structured as limited partnerships. PAUL
GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 26-27 (2d ed. 2004). The default
rule is that managers owe fiduciary duties to limited partners, although some states, notably
Delaware, now permit those duties to be waived by contract. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 171101 (2011) (a general partner's duties to a limited partnership or its unit holders, including
fiduciary duties, "may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership
agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing"). There does not appear to have been much effort to
eliminate such duties in venture capital contracts. Rather, the parties attempt to define those
obligations through covenants in the partnership agreement. See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra,
at 72-77. Moreover, the main constraint limited partners exercise on fund managers is
probably not a lawsuit, but a refusal to invest further funds or a withdrawal of existing funds.
See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9, 11
(2012) (discussing the impact investor lock-in has on venture capitalists).
56
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 47.
57
For a discussion on the importance of reputation to venture capitalists, see C.N.V.
Krishnan et al., Venture Capital Reputation, Post-IPO Performance, and Corporate
Governance, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1295, 1295-96 (2011).
58
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 50.
59
Id. at 58.
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at Mazzucato's case studies, we can begin to see some potential
explanations.
The government invests in innovation for many different reasons
and in many different ways, some of which may be more than a little
inconsistent. The Internet started as Arpanet, a national security project
designed to safeguard government communications in the event of
nuclear war.60 More broadly, Mazzucato points out that Defense
Department spending on advanced and innovative technologies grew out
of the experience of World War II and the Manhattan Project, as well as
the space race and other technological competitions with the Soviet
Union.61 All of this led to investments that were exceedingly well
funded, and "aggressively mission oriented,"62 seeking to "bridge the gap
between blue sky academic work, with long time horizons, and the more
incremental technological development occurring within the military."63
In the area of health care innovation, Mazzucato focuses primarily
on the billions spent annually in grants by the NIH, most of which fund
"basic science" and therefore create the knowledge base that enables
pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs.64 Yet she also points
out that the government, through the Orphan Drug Act,65 targeted and
fostered the creation of specific products in the health care field and that
legislation in conjunction with the Small Business Innovation Research
Act66 played an important role in the creation of start-up biotech firms
Investment in green
like Genzyme, Amgen, and Genentech.67
technology, Mazzucato notes, has been far more equivocal.68 In part this
is because policy makers are not quite sure whether the government's
goal is to foster innovative technology or to reduce carbon emissions.69
She also questions how committed the U.S. government really is to a
policy of developing clean technology.70 Yet despite the State's apparent
inconstancy, there is evidence that government funding is the sole source

60

Id. at 63.
Id. at 74-75.
62
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 75.
63
Id. at 75. For a comparison of this State investment activity with that of Angel
investors, see infra text and notes.
64
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 69.
65
21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 360aa (2012).
66
15 U.S.C. § 638 (2012).
67
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 81.
68
Id. at 112-14.
69
Id. at 118.
70
Id. at 120.
61
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of finance for the riskiest and most capital-intensive clean technology
projects.71
The common thread behind these disparate stories is that the State
does not invest in innovation in order to make a profit, but to achieve
particular policy goals, usually the development of new products
perceived as needed to achieve important national goals such as security,
health, etc.72 As such, the incentives of government actors in making
such investments are totally different from that of private investors. A
project directed at an important national security concern that has an
estimated 50% chance of not failing would look quite promising to the
Defense Department.73 If the project was so new, so shrouded in
Knightian uncertainty that no probability of success could be estimated,
that too might make it an attractive investment because it would show
that this is a relatively unexplored area in which there is potentially much
to be learned.74 Indeed, this is one of the major differences between
private investors and governments (along with academic research
institutions). For the latter, uncertainty itself may be a positive factor
encouraging funding because the government's interest may be as much
in learning about the phenomenon as in profiting from it.75
But the difference between State and private investment is not only
over the difference in the priority given to profit over other goals; it is
also a difference in the group seeking to benefit from the investment.
Venture capitalists, like virtually all capitalists, operate through firms,
and firms are clearly delineated between the equity participants who can
expect to benefit from the firm's investments and everyone else, who
have no right to expect any such benefits.76 The State, however, operates
71

MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 127.
Id. at 195.
73
See id. at 133.
74
See id. at 57-58.
75
For instance, if the Arpanet project had failed, and the Defense Department had
concluded that a decentralized communications system could not be designed to withstand
nuclear attack, that would still be useful information for the Defense Department to have
(although clearly not as useful as a working Internet).
76
This, of course, is somewhat of an overstatement. Most managers are well aware of
the importance of other stakeholder constituencies, particularly employees, to the success of
their ventures, and certainly consider their interests in making important policy decisions.
Indeed, many scholars reject the notion that corporations should be run primarily for the
benefit of their shareholders. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (advocating that corporations have an interest
in stakeholder concerns and social concerns, not just in the wealth maximization of
shareholders); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1050 (1931); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195-96 (2002); Andrew Keay, Tackling the
Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom's 'Enlightened
72
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for the benefit of a broader community, which means that investments
that might be considered failures from the narrow perspective of a firm
might not be considered a failure from the broader viewpoint of a
community or a government.77 Consider the frequent observation that
Silicon Valley is uniquely tolerant of failure78 because failed ventures
provide useful training and experience to budding entrepreneurs and
useful information about what works and does not work.79 Note that
these benefits do not inure in any way to the financial investors in the
failed enterprise, but rather go to the employees of the venture and to the
Silicon Valley community at large.80 Similarly the State, representing
the broader community, stands to gain the benefits of such failures in a
way the failed firm does not.
While nobody knows where innovation comes from, Mazzucato is
pretty sure it is rarely the private business firm.81 She points to
numerous studies that show that there is no linear relationship between
firm investment in research and development and commercially viable
innovations.82 That is, a firm that doubles its investment in R&D is
unlikely to get twice as many innovative products.83 It might get more; it
might get less; it might get none at all. Mazzucato believes that this is
largely because many of the factors that lead to successful innovation are
outside the control of any individual firm.84 For her, the critical
generator of innovation is not the firm but the "network," by which she
means any set of institutional relations by which knowledge is circulated
and diffused through the economy.85 Accordingly, whether a firm can
Shareholder Value Approach', 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 578 (2007); John Kong Shan Ho,
Economic Theories of the Firm Versus Stakeholder Theory: Is There a Governance Dilemma?,
38 H.K.L.J. 399, 399 (2008). Yet the normative view that firms should be managed for their
shareholders remains the majority opinion, particularly in the United States. See Mark J. Roe,
The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2063, 2065 (2001).
77
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 194.
78
See Eric Markowitz, Why Silicon Valley Loves Failures, INC. (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.inc.com/eric-markowitz/brilliant-failures/why-silicon-valley-loves-failures.html.
79
See id. (quoting Erica Zidel) ("[F]ailure is almost synonymous with learning
experience . . . [it shows] you've gathered information on what doesn't work and are better
armed to create something that does.").
80
See id. (quoting Brian O'Malley) ("[S]omething that used to take $10 million to test
out can now be launched for $200,000.").
81
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 119.
82
Id. at 36 ("The causation that occurs in the steps taken between [R&D and
innovations] is not 'linear.'").
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
In setting forth what she describes as a "Schumpeterian" systems account of
innovation, Mazzucato states:
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successfully generate substantial innovation through increased R&D will
depend on numerous factors beyond the firm's control, namely, the other
institutions and individuals that make up the innovation "network" for
the technologies involved.86 Such networks also vary greatly from
industry to industry. As Mazzucato points out, a country may have low
R&D spending if it specializes in economic sectors that "are not sectors
in which innovation occurs necessarily though R&D."87 Yet private
commercial firms clearly provide an essential component to any healthy
innovation network.88 Mazzucato notes, for example, the relative failure
of the Soviet Union in the 1970s to generate substantial innovative
technologies despite investment of over 4% of the country's GDP in
research and development, primarily in military and space technology.89
She compares that with Japan in the 1970s, which spent only 2.5% of its
GDP on research and development, yet managed to become a
"Developmental State" known for its innovative products.90 Mazzucato
attributes this to the fact that "the Soviet Union did not have, or permit,
business enterprises to commercialize the technologies developed by the
State," whereas the Japanese economy was characterized by "strong userproducer linkages."91
When it comes to the United States, Mazzucato shares the view of
many in her field that despite much political rhetoric decrying
government interference in the free market, the United States has acted,
over the past 50 years, as a "hidden Developmental State."92 That is,
while the political rhetoric from both parties during this period have
emphasized the importance of the private sector in economic
development and claimed to reject the policy of "picking winners" for
The perspective is neither macro nor micro, but more meso, where
individual firms are seen as part of a broader network of firms with whom
they cooperate and compete. The system of innovation can be interfirm,
regional, national or global. From the meso perspective the network is the
unit of analysis (not the firm). The network consists of customers,
subcontractors, infrastructure, suppliers, competencies or functions, and the
links or relationships between them. The point is that the competencies that
generate innovation are part of a collective activity occurring through a
network of actors and their links or relationships.
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 36.
86
Id. (opining that innovation is generated by cooperation between "a network of
actors and their links or relationships").
87
Id. at 42
88
See id. at 37 (examining the Soviet Union's slow growth in innovation by not
allowing public technologies to be commercialized in the 1970s).
89
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 37.
90
Id. at 37-38 & n.5.
91
Id. at 37.
92
Id. at 37 n.5.
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government investment as Japan allegedly did in the 1970s, the reality of
U.S. government policy was quite different.93 Ambitious projects
targeting various types of technological innovation were pursued by
federal agencies like ARPA with respect to computer science and the
improbable partnership of the NIH and Department of Energy in
mapping the human genome.94 These projects did indeed "pick winners"
by selecting various technologies for funding as well as promoting
networking and collaboration in various fields and seeking to improve
productivity among the nation's scientists and engineers.95 The ultimate
validation of this "hidden" approach has been its success. Fred Block,
analyzing the "one hundred most innovative commercial products"
selected every year by R&D Magazine, noted that, "In 1975, forty-seven
out of eighty-six domestic innovations were produced by Fortune 500
companies."96 By 2006, however, "big firms were responsible for only
six out of eighty-eight innovations" whereas "fifty of these innovations
were the products of researchers at U.S. government laboratories,
universities, or other public agencies, working alone or in collaboration
with private firms."97
The fact that large private firms are actively seeking government
and academic partners to develop innovative commercial products
strongly supports Mazzucato's view that the government is acting to
make up for a private sector which is increasingly unwilling to operate
under conditions of extreme uncertainty and is even reluctant to
undertake more measurable risks without the promise of substantial
reward.98

93

See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 37 n.5.
See Fred Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden
Developmental State in the United States, 36 POL. & SOC'Y 169, 174-82 (2008); OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 46, at 34 ("Pursuit of government missions has often exerted a
strong influence on commercialization of civilian technologies.").
95
See Block, supra note 94, at 174-82.
96
Id. at 187.
97
Id. For an analysis of the apparent success of government sponsored venture capital
through the Small Business Innovation Research program, see GOMPERS & LERNER, supra
note 55, at 309-342.
98
Effective commercialization is increasingly seen as a central factor in deriving
economic benefit from innovation. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 & n.11 (2012). Indeed, a major concern of
American policymakers in past decades was that other nations, notably Japan, were
successfully commercializing inventions first developed in the United States. OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 46, at 5-7.
94
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A. The Critique of "Financialization" of Private Investment as Inhibiting
Innovation
This notion that something has gone wrong in the private sector's
approach to investment in innovation is a pervasive background theme in
the economic literature on innovation. Mazzucato notes the problem of
"increasing financialization" of the private sector,99 such that corporate
funds that might previously have been spent on R&D now go to stock
buybacks.100 She bemoans the loss of public-private partnerships like
Bell Labs in favor of a private sector increasingly focused "only on short
term profit raising areas."101 She thinks that venture capitalists may be
seeking "not realistic" returns for innovations in certain capital-intensive
technologies.102 All of these concerns echo criticisms that already exist
in the corporate literature about short termism and the dangers of
unrestrained investor activism.
Mazzucato's critique is different,
however, because it is tied so closely to the innovation process. Unlike
other critiques, which ask whether existing resources are being
efficiently utilized in the current managerial environment, Mazzucato's
critique implies that new sources of economic growth are being lost or
slowed in their development because of current corporate law rules.
She is not alone in her critique. Other academic commentators are
also quite disparaging of the role of private finance in development of
innovative products and technologies. Suzanne Berger, MIT Professor
and lead author of a major recent study of the decline of manufacturing
in the United States,103 tells the story of the activist investors who
recently led a shareholder vote to break up the Timken Company.104
Timken was an American manufacturer of both steel and industrial
components.105 Activist shareholders successfully sought to break it into
two companies so that each would provide a financially more attractive
"pure play" in its respective business.106 Management had opposed the
move, arguing that Timken's dual competencies allowed them to finetune the attributes of the steel in order to make superior products.107
Berger views this as emblematic of the financially driven changes in
99

MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 25.
Id. at 25.
101
Id. at 179.
102
Id. at 140.
103
SUZANNE BERGER, MIT TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTION IN THE INNOVATION
ECONOMY, MAKING IN AMERICA: FROM INNOVATIONS TO MARKET (2013).
104
Suzanne Berger, How Finance Gutted Manufacturing, BOS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2014),
archived at https://perma.cc/B2RJ-NT7V.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
100
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corporate America which have impaired the incentives and reduced the
ability of large firms to develop commercially innovative products while
failing to develop a viable alternative system through start-ups and
venture capital.108 As she states:
Today companies harness R&D to specific business
divisions and to near-term product development. Most basic
and precompetitive research starts out in public and private
laboratories isolated from manufacturers. When cuttingedge innovations come out of such laboratories, it is not
clear where to find capital to bring their new products and
processes to market. Who will handle prototyping, pilot
production, testing, and large-scale commercialization?
When DuPont brought nylon into mass production in the
1930s and 1940s, it could draw on its own retained earnings
as well as established relations with investors, bankers,
factories, and suppliers. Today's innovative small company
lacks virtually all of these resources. Investors excel in
providing venture capital funding for startup companies, but
once these companies reach the stage of commercialization
and venture capital is no longer available, they find few
financial backers. Now that investors have curbed their
appetite for startups going public, acquisition by big
companies and recourse to foreign capital seem to be the
main avenues for bringing to market the innovations that
begin life in university and public laboratories. Both of
these routes have troubling implications for American
innovation and jobs.109
Berger's concerns echo Mazzucato's in many respects, similarly
noting the failure of contemporary big firms to engage in basic research,
the substitution of "university and public laboratories" as the places
where cutting edge research takes place, and the inability of start-up
firms to get financing all the way through the commercialization
process.110
108

Berger, supra note 104.
Id. For a discussion on the problem of diminishing IPO opportunities for start-ups,
see Ibrahim, supra note 55, at 11-14.
110
See Berger, supra note 104; see also Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing
the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 4, 5 (1992). Michael Porter, writing
about American competitiveness in 1992, noted that the "shortcomings" of American industry
were frequently blamed on "short time horizons" among other things, but he viewed this as just
109
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Gary Pisano and Willy Shih also decried what they perceive as the
short-term focus of the investment activity of most big American firms,
which led to manufacturing outsourcing and a declining ability to
develop innovative new products.111 While recognizing that pressure
from "Wall Street" was part of the reason for such investment decisions,
Pisano and Shih argued that a relatively short-term risk averse
perspective had been internalized by corporate managers themselves.112
By utilizing analytical models that could not cope well with investments
involving a high degree of uncertainty and by staffing their boards and
higher managerial ranks with people whose expertise is in finance and
management rather than science and technology, these businesses were
losing their ability to evaluate or manage technological innovation.113
In short, there seems to be a fairly well developed consensus
among economists who study innovation that private investors, by
adopting an increasingly narrow short-term approach to investing
activity, are failing optimally to fund research in innovation. This
critique is somewhat different for each of the two main sources of private
investment capital for innovation, technologically sophisticated large
firms and venture capitalists.
With respect to technologically
sophisticated large firms, there is often more than a hint of nostalgia in
the writing of innovation economists for such enterprises as Bell Labs
and Xerox PARC.114 While organized and run by private firms, these
research labs are often idealized as quintessential examples of the kind of
public-private partnerships that provided foundational innovation,
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.115 Yet it is also recognized that
these research labs, while responsible for many important technological
a "symptom of a larger problem." Id. Focusing on the competitive threat of Japan and
Germany, Porter viewed the separation of ownership and control itself as the fundamental
problem, believing that it led to short term investors whose interests were not aligned with
management and interfered with "the flow of capital to those corporate investments that offer
the highest long-run payoffs." Id.
111
Gary P. Pisano & Willy C. Sinh, Restoring American Competitiveness, HARV. BUS.
REV., July-Aug. 2009, at 114.
112
Id. at 124.
113
Id. at 125; see also John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate
Financial Reporting at i (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10550, 2004),
archived at https://perma.cc/H83A-M7ZR ("We find that 55% of managers would avoid
initiating a very positive NPV [Net Present Value] project if it meant falling short of the
current quarter's consensus earnings.").
114
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 24.
115
Bell Labs, of course, was funded by the huge monopoly profits generated by AT&T.
Moreover, the very high marginal tax rates during this period discouraged highly profitable
companies from distributing large amounts of cash to either their shareholders or executives.
Reinvestment in basic research seemed to be both a worthy and potentially valuable use of
such funds. For an analysis of the innovation at Bell Labs, see JON GERTNER, THE IDEA
FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION (2012).
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innovations, were actually not very good at bringing products to
market.116 After all, it was the Japanese who arguably recognized and
exploited the commercial potential of the transistor (first developed in
Bell Labs).117 Today, few large firms seem to have the incentives to
devote substantial funds to large-scale foundational research.118 As we
have seen, such research is incredibly wasteful, frequently involving
large expenditure of R&D with nothing to show for it.119 Moreover, the
fact that the government, along with smaller start-ups, has largely taken
up the task of developing innovative new products enables large firms to
potentially pick and choose among already developed products that are
much closer to commercial viability.120
Another factor, not much mentioned in the literature, but which
certainly seems a part of the story, is that the young scientists, engineers,
and software developers who in previous generations might have sought
relatively secure and well-paying employment at a large corporation are
now more likely to be interested in working at their own start-up
company, looking for financing and seeking to partner with a venture

116

See Malcolm Gladwell, Creation Myth: Xerox PARC, Apple, and the Truth About
Innovation, NEW YORKER, May 16, 2011, at 44; Jon Gertner, Like Building Refrigerators: Bell
Labs and the End of Game-Changing Innovation, TIME (Mar. 27, 2012), archived at
https://perma.cc/K3RY-P7FD.
117
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 38.
118
The frequently cited exception to this trend is Google X, the research arm of Google
that is committed to a kind of "guided" basic research designed to solve big problems (like
driverless cars). See Claire Cain Miller, Bell Labs for Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15,
2014, at 15; Jon Gertner, What Companies Can Learn From Bell Labs, WALL ST. J. DIGITS,
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/04/02/what-companies-can-learn-from-belllabs/. Yet Google X is also trying to improve on the mediocre commercial results of Bell Labs
by focusing on specific projects, which, while foundational, also have clear commercial value
(like driverless cars). Id. The success of this approach remains to be seen. See Alyssa
Newcomb, SXSW 2015: Why Google X Views Failure as a Good Thing, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17,
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/P6GC-YCYN.
119
See Gladwell, supra note 116. For example, many of the critical features of the
personal computer were first developed at Xerox PARC, which then failed to develop them
into a commercially viable product. Id.; DOUGLAS K. SMITH & ROBERT C. ALEXANDER,
FUMBLING THE FUTURE: HOW XEROX INVENTED, THEN IGNORED, THE FIRST PERSONAL
COMPUTER 13-14 (1988).
120
See Gertner, supra note 116. Even Google management has been challenged by
investors for spending too much on R&D. Google co-founder Larry Page reportedly answered
by noting first that "the amounts he was investing were modest in light of Google's profits" and
then asking the financial community, "[s]houldn't they be asking him to make more big, risky,
long-term investments, not fewer?" Jon Gertner, The X Factor, FAST COMPANY, June 2014, at
66, 71.
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capital firm.121 Sale of the innovation to a large firm might be a last step,
but not a first one.122
Mazzucato's critique of venture capitalists is more straightforward.
It is essentially that they do not take enough risks.123 That is, they invest
only in the most commercially viable innovations, after their viability has
been fairly well demonstrated, and only in firms that can be sold at a
substantial profit within a relatively short period of time.124 Given her
theory about the essential role of the state, Mazzucato does not expect
the venture capitalists to fund foundational research, but she does see
their role as moving promising innovations toward commercial
viability.125 That is the necessary next stage in the innovation process,
and one that government, not known for avoiding waste or
inefficiency,126 is not well equipped to do. This is where, according to
Mazzucato, the "financialization" of investment in innovation is causing
opportunities to be lost and innovation stifled.127
Mazzucato's concerns parallel those commentators who talk about
the "Valley of Death" for start-up companies.128 This so-called "Valley
of Death" has traditionally been described as the gap in available
financing between the innovation or seed stage, where a product has been
developed but its commercial viability has not yet been demonstrated and
the stage where there is a viable cash-generating company seeking
capital to develop and grow.129 That is, the innovators know how to
make the product, and know that it works, but do not yet know if the
product can be made and marketed at a price that will be attractive to
consumers or if it will be attractive to consumers at all. This is a point at
which substantial capital is required for market testing, preparation for
production on a commercial scale, packaging and marketing and all the
121

See Yiren Lu, A Tale of Two Valleys, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2014, at 28, 31.
See id.
123
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 13, 161-62.
124
Id. at 48-49.
125
Id. at 116.
126
Id. at 193.
127
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 25.
128
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 55, at 176-200; L.M. MURPHY & P.L.
RICHARDS, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BRIDGING THE
VALLEY OF DEATH: TRANSITIONING FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING 3-4
(2003).
129
See, e.g., Martin Zwillig, 10 Ways for Start-Ups to Survive the Valley of Death,
FORBES (FEB. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/02/18/10-ways-forstartups-to-survive-the-valley-of-death/#1079ec255e40; Paul-Christian Britz, German Startups
Face Funding "Valley of Death", DEUTSCHE WELLE (MAR. 17, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/U2Z6-UU4N; Gabor Garai, A New "Valley of Death" for Venture Financings,
EMERGING COMPANY EXCHANGE (MAR. 27, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/3NQH9K4Y.
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other aspects of turning an idea for a product into an actual profitable
business. Yet during this period the business itself will not be generating
any cash flow. One might think that this is where the venture capitalists
come in, finding the promising product ideas, providing the needed
capital, business expertise, and reputational validation that the start-ups
need, and thereby converting innovators' hopes and dreams into
entrepreneurial success.
Unfortunately, the empirical studies of venture capital investments
indicate that they rarely invest in that early stage in the start-up
process.130 Rather, they prefer to wait until the start-up is actually
generating cash flow or even profit and look to invest in later stage
ventures that are seen to have strong potential for growth and
expansion.131 Start-ups that have not yet reached that point must seek
other, less reliable financing or succumb to the "Valley of Death."132
This then is the reality behind the criticism by Mazzucato and other
innovation economists of the current "financialization" of corporate
managers and investors and their increasing emphasis on the short term.
By focusing solely on investments that are likely to show substantial
returns within a few years, these shortsighted investors may be causing
the economy to lose untold millions in valuable innovation that never
reach the stage of commercial viability.
An important additional element in this story, and one that has
received increased attention in recent years, are the so-called "angel
investors." Angel investors are wealthy individuals133 who generally
invest their own money134 at the early stages of the innovation process.135
130
See, e.g., Tarek Miloud, Arild Aspelund & Mathieu Cabrol, Startup Valuation by
Venture Capitalists: An Empirical Study, 14 VENTURE CAPITAL 151, 151-74 (2012); Steven
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts 9-10 (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices Working Paper
No. 513, 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/9NZS-QWS3.
131
See, e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 130, at 9-10 (collecting data on two
hundred venture-capital investments, and finding only seventy-three were "pre-revenue" or
early stage); Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the JOBS Act's
Transformative Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment Bankers' Jobs?, 1
TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 568 (2014) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original) ("Venture
capital funds typically restrict their investments to startups in later stage[s] and larger deals.").
132
See Zwillig, supra note 129.
133
They generally qualify as "accredited investors" under federal securities laws. MIT
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., VENTURE SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT: ANGEL INVESTORS 10
(2000); SEC Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2016); see also Daniel M. Ibrahim, The (Not So)
Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406 n.1 (2008).
134
Ibrahim, supra note 133, at 1406 n.1; see also Outcomes in Angel Investing, supra
note 40, at 116-19,
135
MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., supra note 133, at 10.
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Beyond that, there is considerable diversity of approach among angel
investors. Some have personal ties to the entrepreneurs; others do not.136
Some provide substantial managerial and financial expertise to the startup ventures, while others take a "hands-off" approach.137 Some are
investing purely as a profit-making venture, but many have a mix of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives.138 Some are successful tech
entrepreneurs seeking to "give back" to the communities that made them
rich.139 Others are seeking to foster innovation for innovation's sake.140
Because angels have these mixed motives141 and are investing their own
funds unburdened by limited partners, they behave more like
Mazzucato's State in certain respects than like other venture capital
investors, particularly in their willingness to invest in highly uncertain
and sometimes financially questionable ventures.142
Yet even though the amount of angel investing has grown
substantially in recent years, experts generally agree it has not solved the
problem of financing innovation that Mazzucato describes, but has, at
most, just altered it somewhat. Investors at the seed stage are still faced,
of course, with very substantial uncertainty, but angel investors can
ameliorate the problem to some degree by investing relatively small
amounts in a large number of different companies.143 Paradoxically,
however, this seems to be creating even more companies that get through
the seed stage and develop potentially commercially viable projects.
However, if they subsequently seek a larger tranche of financing to move
136
See Urien & Groshoff, supra note 131, at 568-69 (discussing and describing angel
investors); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389,
3398 (2013) (same).
137
MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., supra note 133, at 16.
138
Id. at 14-15.
139
Id. at 2.
140
See id. at 17-21 (separating the "diversity" of angel investors into four categories).
141
Although many commentators have noted increased professionalization among
angel investors and the formation of angel investment groups and clubs, these changes do not
seem to have greatly altered the "mixed motives" of seeking to help and to profit from budding
entrepreneurs that underlying investments. The New York Times, reporting recently on the
exponential growth of angel investing among wealthy Silicon Valley businesspeople, noted
that such investments function more as a "status symbol" than a source of income and that
newcomers are told that they "should expect to lose money." Mike Issac, Where Countless
Angels Tread, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 2015, at B1.
142
A recent study comparing angel and VC investing found that angel-only deals had a
greater "time to resolution" than VC deals with no greater probability of success. In fact, for
large investments, angel performance was poorer than that for VCs. The authors conclude that
their findings are " most supportive of angel preferences aligning more with the entrepreneur
and less with VCs." Brent Goldfarb et al., Are Angels Different? An Analysis of Early Venture
Financing (Univ. of Md. Robert H. Smith Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. RHS 06-072,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024186.
143
See MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., supra note 133, at 56.
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into full-scale commercial development, the angels who have provided
the relatively small amounts of seed financing to large numbers of
projects will not usually provide the substantially greater amounts of
capital these projects need.144 Venture capitalists, for the reasons
Mazzucato describes, still see these companies' prospects as too
uncertain and their paths to profitability too long to generate much
venture capitalist interest. Similarly, in fields like biotech, where large
pharmaceutical firms rather than venture capitalists are the primary
source for funding, sub-optimal risk aversion and short-term perspectives
may well inhibit investing activity by such firms.145
B. The Corporate Law Debates About Short Termism
The allegation of increasing short termism rings true to corporate
lawyers because we are well aware of the changes in corporate
governance and managerial practices that have arguably changed the
behavior of corporate managers and private investors. Until about the
late 1960s,146 managers ran most publicly traded companies with little
interference from anyone.147
With shareholders dispersed and
disaggregated and corporate boards filled with friends, acquaintances,
and more junior executives, corporate CEOs had unfettered discretion to
run their companies as they thought best.148 This discretion could result
in bloated staffs and corporate jets as well as relatively low shareholder
returns, but in some cases, it also produced a lot of R&D spending and
With the
even unique innovation factories like Bell Labs.149
development of the hostile takeover, CEOs faced the first real threat to
144

A recent study found that at the earliest stages of investment, when small amounts
of capital are sufficient, angel investors alone may supply it, but when larger investments are
needed "even sophisticated angels are insufficient and VC participation is generally
necessary." Goldfarb et al., supra note 142, at 3; see also Outcomes in Angel Investing, supra
note 40, at 1118-19 (finding that angels who did not emphasize "prediction" tended to make
smaller investments).
145
Bruce Booth, The Venture Funding Boom in Biotech: A Few Things It's Not,
FORBES (Jul. 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebooth/2015/07/23/the-venturefunding-boom-in-biotech-a-few-things-its-not/#44202e16439c ("The big recent uptick above
the normal $1-1.5B that’s invested quarterly into biotech isn't coming from the coffers of
venture capitalists, it's coming from hedge funds and public market 'crossover' investors.").
146
For an interesting analysis of the American economy at this time, based on
observations that the managers of large oligopolistic corporations faced no serious competitive
pressures and could control demand for their products through advertising, see JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 29-31 (1967).
147
See id. at 49.
148
See id. at 49-50.
149
See id. at 392-93.
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their managerial discretion (and their jobs).150 This threat was followed
by a growing tendency both of investors and managers themselves to
view managerial performance from the perspective of short-term
earnings.151 Evaluations of managerial quality and movements in stock
price were increasingly dependent on whether a company's quarterly
earnings reports were positive, growing, and meeting analyst
expectations.152 While some of this short-term perspective has been
blamed on institutional investors pushing corporate governance reforms
and activist fund managers seeking short-term market gains,153 it appears
that the more powerful factors have been the changes in executive
compensation, CEO turnover, and board composition, as well as the
increased financial reporting and dissemination of quarterly financial
results.154
The most important evidence (as well as the most important effect)
of such short termism is the trend away from capital expenditures by
large firms (including investment in research and development) in favor
of using excess cash for massive stock buybacks.155 As the economists
of innovation and others have amply documented, there has been a
substantial decline at large private firms in R&D with respect to basic
science and innovative technology.156 Such firms are frequently
generating large amounts of profit and free cash flow but are spending it
primarily on stock buybacks that enhance shareholder wealth but do
nothing for innovation.157 Nor is it reasonable to expect fundamentally
different investment strategies from venture capitalists.
Venture
capitalists, after all, are expected by investors to provide greater returns

150

Gregg D. Polsky & Andrew C.W. Lund, Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure
Short-Termism?, GOVERNANCE STUD. (Brookings Inst., D.C.), Mar. 2013, at 1, 2, archived at
https://perma.cc/A6TE-J2E3.
151
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 108.
152
See id.
153
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The Threat to the Economy and Society from Activism and
Short-Termism Updated, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 27,
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TG79-JF8T.
154
See Graham, supra note 113, at 1-3; Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton,
How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and
Increasingly Uneasy CEOs 1 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 12465, 2006);
Polsky & Lund, supra note 150, at 1.
155
See, e.g., Lu Wang & Callie Bost, S&P 500 Companies Spend Almost All Profits on
Buybacks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:04 AM), archived at https://perma.cc/G5GP-CJK4;
The Repurchase Revolution, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, at 73; Bud Myers, U.S. Corporations
Spent $1 Trillion in Stock Buybacks, ECON. POPULIST (Apr. 24, 2015, 10:38 PM), archived at
https://perma.cc/UVU6-DR7M.
156
Matthew Philips & Peter Coy, Look Who's Driving R&D Now, BLOOMBERG (June
4, 2015, 12:14 PM), archived at https://perma.cc/7AVM-HJ6W.
157
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 26.
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than they could get by simple market investments in S&P 500 firms.158
Accordingly, the venture capitalists cannot allocate many investment
slots to "longshots" that are likely to diminish their total portfolio returns
but must allocate almost all of their investment capital to startups that are
at least promising and perhaps already on the verge of success.159
The fear and criticism of the perceived growing tendency toward
"short termism" among corporate managers has been a substantial
concern of corporate lawyers and academics for many years, and has
engendered numerous debates over whether various aspects of corporate
law should be changed to promote and enable corporate managers to
more easily implement long-term strategies.160 Very broadly speaking,
most, but by no means all, corporate law theorists agree that the
appropriate goal of corporate management should be to maximize longterm shareholder welfare.161 This implies, of course, that pressure to
adopt short-term strategies that diminish long-term value to shareholders
should be discouraged, perhaps by measures that insulate managers from
shareholder pressure. Unfortunately, deciding when short-term strategies
are detrimental to long-term welfare and when managerial insulation is
beneficial to long-term value are highly controversial questions. Debates
rage on controversial features of contemporary corporate law from board
classification to investor activism to dual class stock.162 The basic
problem is that almost every provision that can protect management's
long-term investment strategies can also foster managerial overreach and
mismanagement.
Concern about fostering innovation does not play a major role in
these debates. Legal scholars tend to assume that if any laws play a role
in fostering innovation, they are the laws of intellectual property that
protect inventors, modified perhaps by an appropriate dose of industrial
158
Why Private Equity Will Keep Beating the S&P 500, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON
(Oct. 15, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/MNF4-MV72.
159
For a discussion of the concerns about "grandstanding" among venture capitalists,
see GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 55, at 377-89.
160
Martin Lipton, Succeeding in the New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 15, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/A9KM-3ZEL; Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and LongTermism 2-6 (Feb. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731814.
161
See infra Part II.B.
162
See generally Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 113, 113 (2007); see also David Benoit & Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors
Helping or Undermining American Companies?, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015) http://www.wsj.
com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712; James Kristie, Dual-Class
Stock: Governance at the Edge, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 3d Quarter 2012, at 37, archived at
https://perma.cc/QBD2-26QC.
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policy in the form of antitrust or federal administrative agency
regulation.163 At the core of Mazzucato's book, however, is the potent
but ultimately unprovable assertion that relatively recent changes in the
financial sector have reduced the scope and effectiveness of private
investment in innovation.164
The assertion is ultimately unprovable in that we can never know
what innovations would have been discovered and developed but for the
financialization and short termism of the private investment sector that
Mazzucato decries. Yet there is substantial evidence that is consistent
with Mazzucato's thesis, notably (1) the massive increase in the amount
of corporate profits spent on stock buybacks rather than capital
investments in recent years;165 (2) a growing recognition of the power of
investor activism to influence managerial decision-making and the
growing expressions of concern by corporate managers that their ability
to make optimal long-term investments for the company is being
impaired;166 (3) considerable use of managerial protective devices like
dual class stock and staggered boards in technological and other
innovation-oriented industries;167 (4) a general consensus among
economists of innovation that the private sector is not investing optimally
in innovative technologies;168 and (5) the objective facts, set forth by
Mazzucato and others, that most of the major commercially important
innovations of the last half century have been the result of government or
government/academic projects.169
It is useful, therefore, to consider whether current investment
behavior by the private sector could be modified to encourage greater
investment in innovation and the role that corporate law could play in
such modification. That is the focus of the following section.
163

See Jonathan Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 578-79 (2007); Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual
Property Law And Regulatory Processes To Foster The Innovation and Diffusion of
Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 8-9 (1996); Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1256, 1279-80 (1981).
164
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 47-50.
165
Id. at 26.
166
Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of Shareholder Activism and Its Place in Corporate
Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791, 804 & n.58 (2014).
167
See Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1053-55 (2010)
(finding in dual-class firms that insider share ownership is associated with increased firm
value, but in contrast, insider vote ownership is associated with decreased firm value).
168
Steve Denning, Why Can't the Private Sector Innovate Anymore?, FORBES (Feb. 25,
2013), http://onforb.es/15K5Poa (presenting a general critique of private sector capital
allocation arguing in part that this misallocation is behind stagnant innovation and growth).
169
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 79-80.
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II. INNOVATION PROMOTION AS THE GOVERNING NORM
OF CORPORATE LAW
A. The Case for Growth Over "Static" Efficiency
Like Mariana Mazzucato, Robert Cooter is an economist with a
strong interest in innovation. But while Mazzucato's method is empirical
and historical, Cooter's work is highly abstract and theoretical.170 Also
unlike Mazzucato, Cooter is deeply involved in the field of law and
economics and is very concerned with the specific effects that legal rules
have on growth and innovation. His most recent book, The Falcon's
Gyre: Legal Foundations of Economic Innovation and Growth, is a
theoretical analysis of law's impact on innovation and economic growth
and a normative argument that fostering such innovation should be a
primary goal of lawmakers and judges. 171
The first chapter of Cooter's book is a powerful critique of
traditional law and economics (which he refers to as "static economics")
in favor of a norm that "prioritizes growth economics."172 Central to
Cooter's argument is the "overtaking principle," the idea that because
rapid economic growth is exponential, its beneficial effects will in most
cases rapidly outpace any benefits that can be derived simply by utilizing
existing resources more efficiently.173 As he says:
Which was more important to agricultural production,
inventing a tractor or using horses more efficiently? A
better allocation of horses for plowing the fields increases
agricultural production marginally, whereas inventing the
tractor caused a jump in production. Once you appreciate
170
Broadly speaking, Cooter and Mazzucato can be viewed as representing two ends of
a spectrum of approaches economists use when studying innovation. Mazzucato, following an
evolutionary Schumpeterian approach, resists generalizations and emphasizes the disruptive,
disequilibrating effects of innovation that can best be studied on a case-by-case basis. See
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950).
Economists like Cooter, while recognizing the inadequacy of static efficiency-based models,
look to replace them with more dynamic but still highly abstract models of the innovation
process. See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson & Paul M. Romer, Science, Economic Growth & Public
Policy, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 9, 14.
171
ROBERT D. COOTER WITH AARON EDLIN, THE FALCON'S GYRE: LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH (2014) [hereinafter FALCON'S
GYRE], archived at https://perma.cc/JV9D-G5UE.
172
Id. at 1.17.
173
Id. at 1.17-18.
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exponential growth, it's hard to care about static efficiency
for its own sake.174
As this example illustrates, Cooter believes that exponential
economic growth is most likely to be brought about by innovation.175
Not only does innovation use resources in substantially different and
more efficient ways, but the ideas which constitute the core of most
successful innovations are not depleted by being shared176 so they may
be widely disseminated and produce even greater increases in wealth.177
Given these considerations, it is hard to argue with Cooter's conclusion
that to the extent law can be used to foster innovation and economic
growth, that should be a lawmaker's first priority.178 I suspect that
Mazzucato would wholeheartedly agree.
There remains the question, of course, as to what types of laws
actually do foster innovation. In his book, Cooter focuses almost
exclusively on intellectual property law.179 It is intellectual property law
that creates the rights innovators receive to benefit exclusively from their
innovations and thereby arguably creates the incentive for innovation
itself.180 Cooter is well aware of the ongoing debates about the dangers
of over or under protection of patent rights and develops a model in
which different types of innovations would get different levels of legal
protection in an effort to maximize incentives to innovate.181
With respect to the role of corporate law in fostering innovation
and economic growth, however, Cooter has much less to say. He is
aware of the enabling aspects of contract and corporate law and writes
approvingly of the way contract terms and corporate structures can be
used to address what he views as the central problem in financing
innovation, the "double trust dilemma."182 This is a form of prisoner's
174

Id. at 1.17.
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 1.8-1.9.
176
In economic terms, they are "nonrival goods." Nelson & Romer, supra note 170, at
175

15-16.

177

Cooter also notes some empirical studies that conclude that "[i]n the last 100 years,
innovation caused more economic growth than anything else, including using more resources."
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 1.6.
178
See id. at 1.16-17.
179
In an earlier piece on growth economics co-authored with Aaron Edlin, the authors
also used examples from antitrust and tort law. Robert Cooter & Aaron Edlin, Law and
Growth Economics: A Framework for Research 21-24 (Berkeley Program in Law & Econ.,
Working Paper Series, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/E54N-M56F.
180
For a discussion of the ongoing debate whether intellectual property (primarily
patent) law creates the proper incentives for optimal innovation, see Michael J. Burstein,
Patent Markets: A Framework for Evaluation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507, 512-14 (2015).
181
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 6.1.
182
Id. at 3.1.
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dilemma in which the innovator must reveal his idea to the financier to
obtain capital but fears his idea will then be appropriated. In turn, the
financier must provide capital to the innovator to obtain her expertise in
developing the product but fears her capital will be appropriated.183 The
imperfect but adequate solution, in Cooter's account, is the standard
venture capital agreement, buttressed by legally enforceable contractual
and fiduciary duties.184
Cooter says little about the dilemma that is central to Mazzucato—
the failure of finance capital adequately to fund the earlier stages of
development and commercialization of innovation. On Cooter's model,
financiers not only evaluate the ideas presented to them but can make
reasonably accurate predictions of the likely financial outcomes of their
commercialization. This may well reflect what venture capitalists are
actively trying to do and generally succeed in doing for innovations that
are well along in the development process or whose commercial potential
can be adequately ascertained and evaluated.185 But Mazzucato also
describes a whole universe of other ideas, half formed, less well
developed, most of which will be never be commercially viable.
However, a few, if properly developed, could contribute enormously to
economic growth (as well as making the developers very rich).186 At the
time such ideas are initially presented for financing, however, there is no
way to determine their likely commercial value.187 Reaching the point
where such a determination can be made will itself require substantial
expenditures. On this point, Cooter's model and Mazzucato's empirical
account agree as to the result. Since such ideas cannot be shown to be
readily profitable for the financiers, they do not get financed.188
Cooter does mention angel investors and recognizes the role they
can play in developing ideas whose economic value may not yet be
subject to reasonably accurate determination. As he describes it, angels
are usually family or friends who, because they have confidence in the
innovator, "invest without fully understanding the innovation's market
183

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962). In a recent
article, Michael Burstein traces the history of this problem and criticizes some of its basic
assumptions about information in order to provide a more nuanced and heterogeneous account
of the various forms information exchange can take. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging
Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 255 (2012).
184
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 3.12-13.
185
Id. at 3.8.
186
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 193-98.
187
See id. at 139-40.
188
See id. at 161-62; FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 2.6.
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value."189 Cooter's characterization of these investors as semi-rational
and semi-knowledgeable indicates that he does not see their role as
pivotal in the financing of innovation. Unlike venture capitalists, they
have no real incentive or ability to develop potentially valuable
innovations.190 Rather, it is up to the innovators to convince the venture
capitalists of the value of their ideas, and the venture capitalists who are
presumed to have a special expertise in evaluating and fostering such
ideas.191
Nonetheless, the normative aspects of Cooter's work make a
compelling case for rethinking corporate law. If we import into Cooter's
model the basic points of Mazzucato's critique: (1) that potentially
valuable innovations are not being developed because the time horizons
of investors are too short; (2) that those time horizons are not chosen to
maximize successful investment in innovation, but are the product of
financial pressures and concerns of exogenous groups (like shareholders)
with little interest in or understanding of innovation; and (3) that such
groups are empowered to constrain investor action by various aspects of
contemporary corporate law,192 then the conclusion is clear.
Contemporary corporate law is suboptimal with respect to encouraging
economic growth and needs to be changed.
This conclusion follows directly from Cooter's "overtaking"
principle, which privileges increases in innovation and economic growth
over mere increases in static efficiency.193 Accordingly, arguments that
laws empowering shareholders decrease agency costs and lead to a more
efficient use of corporate funds can have little impact once it is
recognized that those same laws are also reducing managerial ability to
invest corporate cash flow in innovations leading to economic growth.
Reduction of agency costs is exactly the kind of rearrangement of
existing resources that Cooter argues can never compete, in the long run,
with the benefits conferred by fostering innovation.194 For that same
reason, it is useless to try to measure or compare the efficiency gains
obtained by reduction of agency costs against the loss of valuable
innovation investments. Not only does the non-linear nature of the
results of investment in innovation make it impossible to predict the
189

FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 3.11.
Id. at 3.11-12
191
Id. at 3.12.
192
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 48-49.
193
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 1.17.
194
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Since the
seminal work of Jensen and Meckling, reduction of agency costs has been seen as a
fundamental goal of both corporate governance and corporate law.
190
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value or even the amount of innovations lost by suboptimal corporate
law rules, it is also a comparison of apples to oranges. Reductions of
agency costs are certainly beneficial to the firm and its shareholders, but
the benefits conferred do not increase over time. Quite the contrary, as a
firm's operations become more efficient, it will likely become more
difficult to find equivalent efficiency gains in subsequent periods. An
innovation, on the other hand, as it grows in popularity and diverse
applications, is likely to provide increasing benefits not only to the firm
but to society as well. Accordingly, application of Cooter's principles
seem to require a complete reorientation of corporate law away from
agency cost reduction and toward encouragement of innovation.
B. Innovation Maximization Through Managerial Primacy
and Long-Term Perspectives
Such a reorientation would resolve many of the debates that have
roiled corporate law scholarship in recent years, particularly involving
the related questions of long-term versus short-term managerial
perspectives and managerial versus shareholder primacy. For those who
have argued in favor of corporate law rules that encourage managerial
primacy and a long-term perspective, the impact of these rules on
innovation provides a powerful new argument in their favor.195
Proponents have long argued that managers will act differently if the law
promotes managerial discretion to act in the long-term best interests of
the company, and one of the major differences will be greater freedom
and incentives to undertake longer-term investments with riskier payoffs
and less certain impacts on share price, precisely the characteristics of
investments in innovation.196 In traditional corporate law debates, these
presumed benefits have been "weighed" against the downsides of the
managerial primacy model, managerial overreaching, mismanagement,
and increased agency costs.197 Moreover, many questioned whether
managing for the long and short term were really so different, or whether
most of the same actions promoting firm value maximization would be
undertaken under either legal regime.198
195

See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 49.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744-51 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656, 66162, 713-15, 726 (2010).
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See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561-65 (2003).
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On the latter point, the difference between long- and short-term
perspectives, Mazzucato's argument concerning the informational
uncertainty inherent in investments in innovation suggests that, for those
investments at least, the differences in time perspective have real
consequences. 199 Developing a new product, determining whether it is
commercially viable and how best to market it can take a considerable
period of time. During that time, a manager, even if she believes the
product is likely to be highly profitable in the long run, may be unable to
credibly convey that belief to the public and the public stock markets,
both because of the uncertainty inherent in innovation development and
concerns about prematurely revealing proprietary information.
Accordingly, such managers may be subject to substantial criticism and
even potential loss of their jobs from outside investors (or even outside
directors) concerned with short-term corporate performance.200 Ex ante,
the increased ability of shareholders to pressure management to
maximize short-term share value will have the effect of discouraging
investments in innovation, even if they might lead to greater long-term
firm value.201
The usual response of the shareholder empowerment proponents is
to "balance" such costs against the powerful evidence of efficiency gains
due to increased constraints on managerial waste and misconduct.202 But
Cooter's argument for privileging rules fostering innovation places a
powerful thumb on the scale.203 Given Cooter's "overtaking" principle,
the benefits of exponential economic growth promoted by giving
managers greater freedom to invest in innovation will ultimately far
outweigh the more limited savings brought about through reduction of
agency costs. Cooter's argument also calls into question a fundamental
premise of the existing corporate law debate, that the question at issue is
an empirical one and the relative costs and benefits of shareholder and
managerial primacy can be resolved, or at least illuminated, by event
studies relating to stock prices and firm value.204
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Id. at 49.
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Even Lucien Bebchuk, probably the foremost proponent of increased shareholder
empowerment, recognizes that, as a theoretical matter, insulating management from short-term
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Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2013). He
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In a recent essay, Professor Lucian Bebchuk explains the role he
thinks such empirical studies play in these ongoing debates.205 His
argument is not that the empirical work disproves or even contradicts the
claims of those expressing concerns about short termism.206 Rather, he
argues that "[those advocating that managers be insulated from shortterm pressures] should recognize that they have been making contestable
empirical claims that must be backed up by evidence,"207 and that the
empirical work "does not support the claims of insulation advocates . . .
."208 In short, this is a failure-of-proof argument that finds the evidence
of presumed benefits from provisions protecting managers (or presumed
losses from provisions empowering shareholders) to be lacking.
Leaving aside (for now) the question of who should have the
burden of proof when all that can be shown is a lack of evidence,
consider what the empirical studies actually show. They are attempts to
measure the costs and benefits of various management-protective or
shareholder-empowering provisions or actions taken by real companies
as reflected in their stock prices over time.209 For example, many of the
important studies are of the effects on stock prices or firm value of
staggered boards, which, as Bebchuk notes, "is widely regarded as a key
provision for determining the extent to which a board is insulated."210 A
number of empirical studies of the effects of adoption of such staggered
board provisions by public companies found that they were significantly
associated with decreases in firm value.211 During this same period (and
certainly not by coincidence), there was growing institutional
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Bebchuk, supra note 202, at 1645.
Id. at 1643-45.
Id. at 1643.
208
Id.
209
Most of these studies seek to measure costs and benefits by reference to changes in
the market price of stocks or Tobins Q (which is itself dependent on market price). See, e.g.,
Bebchuk, supra note 202, at 1670-72, 1685.
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Id. at 1685.
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See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect
Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 628 (2014);
Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113 (2007);
Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN.
ECON. 501, 502 (2007) (stating "the question of whether classified boards benefit or hurt
shareholders is largely an empirical matter"); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie,
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 42 J. FIN. 1851 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 430 (2005). But see,
David A. Becher, Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. Lemmon, Board Classification and
Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control 87 J. FIN. ECON.
656 (2008).
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shareholder pressure opposing the use of staggered boards and
encouraging shareholder proposals to declassify boards.212
We will have more to say about these event studies in the next
section, but for now, it is worth noting that they are unlikely to shed
much light on the effects of various corporate governance devices on
innovation. As Mazzucato emphasizes, successful innovation is rare and
only very loosely related to capital expenditure in any event.213 These
event studies involve generalizations about large numbers of publicly
traded companies, most of which are not engaged in significant
innovation or product development.214 Accordingly, studies that seek to
measure effects of a particular corporate governance mechanism on firm
value are going to be measuring almost exclusively what Cooter would
call the static efficiency effects of such provisions, the fact that, for
example, staggered boards make agency-cost-reducing takeovers less
likely. While there could conceivably be some companies in the
staggered board group whose stock price increased as a result of
successful investment in innovation, the impact of any such results
would be swamped by the vastly larger number of companies whose
stock price would presumably all show the effect of the decreased
likelihood of takeovers. In short, the rarity of significant innovation and
the long time frames associated with its successful commercial
implementation make it highly unlikely that significant effects of such
innovation will be seen in event studies involving all publicly traded
firms.
There are two other problems with trying to test the innovation
economists' critique of short termism using an event study methodology.
First, as noted previously, an innovating firm or its shareholders may not
capture much of the value of a particular innovation.215 Another firm
may come up with a more commercially viable application, or a nonpatentable idea may be widely copied and exploited on an industry-wide
basis. Second, event studies require an assumption of relative uniformity
212

See Maxwell Murphy, Classified Boards Remain in the Crosshairs, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.
5,
2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/05/classified-boards-remain-in-thecrosshairs/; Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P
500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013). Yet the diminution in staggered boards among
large publicly traded companies is somewhat counterbalanced by the apparent preference for
newly public companies to adopt classified boards prior to the time they first issue shares to
the public. See Mira Ganor, Why Do Dual-Class Firms Have Staggered Boards? 3 (July 22,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2469650. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/9S3G-XMR2.
213
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 59.
214
See id.
215
See id. at 69-70.
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among firms, at least insofar as the effects of a given event may be
averaged and generalized among firms to give us a coherent result. To
study innovation in this way requires us to assume that innovation itself
is a repetitive process, caused, or at least encouraged by various inputs
whose effects can be isolated and studied over time. While to some
degree it is necessary to make such assumptions in order to think
theoretically at all about innovation, both Mazzucato's case studies and
the history of innovation itself cast doubt on our ability to predict where
new ideas come from and who is in the best position to develop and
exploit them. Recognizing the contingency of such innovation, however,
also puts us in the difficult position of acknowledging that we can never
really know the value of the innovations that have been lost if our
investments in innovation have indeed been suboptimal. One cannot
easily study what has not occurred.
Has Cooter therefore solved the problem of corporate law? Does
his privileging of innovation promotion and economic growth provide a
meta-principle that justifies constraining shareholder interference in
managerial decision-making and requiring managers to adopt a long-term
perspective? Not necessarily. Cooter himself recognizes that legal rules
are two-edged swords. The same patent law rules that create incentives
to invest in innovation may also, in other contexts, be overbroad and
discourage valuable additional innovations.216 What is needed, he
argues, is a careful fine tuning of the legal rules that seeks to promote the
basic goals of innovation promotion and economic growth while
remaining sensitive to differences in context and application.217
With respect to corporate law, I think Cooter would conclude that
a similar sort of fine tuning is needed.218 When it comes to defining and
limiting the respective powers of innovators and those who invest in
innovation, Cooter believes that fiduciary duties provide a solution.219 It
216

See FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 3.10.
Id. at 3.17-3.18.
218
Some scholars have identified specific situations where governance mechanisms
usually considered detrimental to firm value may play a positive role. For example, Mira
Ganor points out that a company with dual class stock probably obtains no greater takeover
deterrent effect by adopting a staggered board, but such an arrangement might empower
outside directors relative to incumbent management. See Ganor, supra note 212, at 18-19;
Mark Humphery-Jenner, Takeover Defenses, Innovation, And Value-Creation: Evidence From
Acquisition Decisions, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 668, 668 (2014). "Hard-to-value" companies
may derive particular benefits from anti-takeover provisions. Id.
219
See FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 3.7-3.9; Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1050, 1071-75 (1991).
217
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is that set of corporate law rules which he believes helps solve the
"double trust problem" by ensuring that courts will punish any manager
of a start-up company who tries to appropriate more than his bargainedfor share of the profits by preventing mismanagement and
overreaching.220 Structural corporate law rules that empower investors
can help as well, by providing them with board seats mandating periodic
reporting and allowing them to enforce standards of candor and accuracy
with respect to such reporting.
Accordingly, a corporate law designed to optimize investment in
innovation and economic growth would not be one that removed all
constraints on managerial discretion. Ideally, such law would distinguish
managerial actions that promoted innovation investment and long-term
growth from those involving self-dealing, misappropriation of firm
assets, mismanagement, oppression of minority shareholders, empire
building, and all the other forms of managerial malfeasance that tend to
decrease rather than increase long-term firm value. With respect to the
many firms that have no incentive or ability to engage in significant
innovation investment, the governing corporate law rules might look no
different than current law.
For firms seeking to promote and invest in innovation, however,
optimizing corporate law rules will require a searching inquiry into all
aspects of contemporary corporate law and practice, seeking to determine
the ways they affect managerial incentives and ability to invest in
innovation. Again, I would expect that many legal rules, like those
strongly discouraging self-dealing221 and oppression of minorities,222
would remain largely unchanged. Those more likely to directly affect
managerial investment incentives, like performance-based pay,223
220

See id.
See Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999) ("The absolute
prohibition under common law against self-dealing by a trustee has been modified in the
corporate setting to offer a safe harbor for the directors of a corporation if the transaction is
approved by a majority of disinterested directors."); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors . . . are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011).
222
See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993):
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing
minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting
with consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our
corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a courtimposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.
223
See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227,
229-30 (1999). Performance-based pay is seen as a way to motivate and reward executives.
Id. Moreover, it "provid[es] incentive for executives to perform in ways that maximize
221
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shareholder voting rights,224 and takeover defenses,225 are likely to be
subject to more rethinking and refinement, and, at least in some cases, a
nudge in the direction of greater protection of managerial discretion to
make long-term investments in innovation.
At least as important as striking the right balance between
shareholder and managerial power, however, is determining the optimal
level of generality at which these rules should apply. Most corporate law
rules currently make no distinction between different types of businesses
in which corporations may be engaged.226 Implicit in Cooter's principle
of privileging innovation investment is the prospect that different firms
with different likelihoods of contributing to economic innovation should
be treated differently.227 This could take the form of creating new and
distinct corporate law rules for certain types of companies—technology,
pharmaceutical, venture capital, etc. It might also take the form of
allowing any firm that can credibly show a commitment to innovation
investment to "opt into" various managerial protective provisions, like
dual class stock and staggered boards. Or it might take the form of caseby-case adjudications in which justifications of managerial conduct
based on credible showings of an innovation investment motive are given
greater weight or deference by courts than other managerial motives like
cost cutting or expansion of existing businesses.
In short, it is hard to say at this point how much of corporate law
would actually change if academics, lawmakers, and judges heeded the
economists' call to make innovation promotion the first priority of
corporate law. What seems clearer is that it would change the discourse
and the thinking with which corporate lawyers approach these issues.
corporate/shareholder wealth and/or as a way of paying executives commensurately with their
contribution to a corporation's growth and performance." Id.
224
See Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contract, 36 J.
CORP. L. 113, 138 (2010) (discussing how shareholders have the ability to "improve
managerial performance and accountability through active voting"). See generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 602
(2006) (stating that "many observers believe that shareholder voting is an integral component
of corporate governance. Even sophisticated corporate law experts, such as those on the
Delaware courts, say so: 'The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests'").
225
See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1302-03 (2001) (explaining how some argue that "[takeover]
defenses reduce firm value[] by increasing agency costs between shareholders and
managers[]," while, on the other hand, others argue that "[takeover] defenses have largely
positive effects on firm value []by increasing bargaining power or overcoming some market
failure.").
226
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011).
227
FALCON'S GYRE, supra note 171, at 4.8.
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C. Promotion of Diverse Investor Perspectives
Perhaps even more important to the promotion of innovation,
however, is encouragement and preservation of different perspectives
and approaches to investment in innovation. The basic Schumpeterian
theory of innovation requires that unusual ideas generate enough interest
among at least some investors to get financed and commercially
developed.228 It is then that innovations are subject to the Darwinian test
of the market and their success or failure can be truly determined.229
Most will fail.230 Some will succeed modestly, and a few will provide
the wild and unexpected success that will disrupt industries and form the
basis for further exponential economic growth.231
Mazzucato's critique, as we have seen, is that private investors are
not funding enough ideas, and thus are not bringing enough ideas to
commercial development where their success of failure can be
definitively determined.232 This is not because there is insufficient
private investment capital,233 nor is it because private investors are not
seeking potentially lucrative investments in innovation. It is because
they are all seeking the same exact type of potentially lucrative
investments—companies with an identifiable product or business that is
at or close to the stage where it is generating positive cash flow, is ready
for market testing and commercial production and has a good chance of
being highly profitable and potentially saleable within five to seven
years.234 Investments that are generally thought to meet these criteria are
highly sought after in Silicon Valley and beyond.235
The problem, as Mazzucato sees it, is that these criteria are too
narrow and too uniform.236 More investment in innovation would take
place, and importantly, more investment in different types of innovation
would take place, if at least some investors could adopt a fifteen-year
time frame for commercial success, or be willing to accept a business
228

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 34-36.
230
See Anne Fisher, Why Most Innovations Are Great Big Failures, FORTUNE (Oct. 7,
2014, 2:27 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/10/07/innovation-failure/.
231
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 58, 161.
232
See id. at 47-50.
233
Lauren Gensler, U.S. Companies Are Spending Like Crazy And Still Have A Record
$1.73 Trillion In Cash, FORBES (May 8, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/
2015/05/08/u-s-companies-cash-pile-hits-1-73t/#3febb02567fc (noting that much of that
excess cash is in technology companies).
234
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 47-50.
235
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 55, at 23.
236
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 41-44.
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that was likely to generate only modest returns for many years, or invest
in a potential business whose product was still under development and
the commercial form it would take was still unknown. Such an increase
in the types of investments being made is the most likely way to generate
more successful innovations being presented to the market and to
generate more economic growth.
But is the tendency of most innovation investors to think alike and
evaluate investments in similar ways a corporate law problem and does it
have a corporate law solution? The answer to both questions is a
qualified and limited "yes." Even if we believe, as many critics of
innovation investment do, that the fundamental problem of conformity
among investors is the similarity in the way they analyze and evaluate
investment opportunities,237 it is still helpful to examine the objective
external factors that may foster such conformity. For corporate
managers such incentives include quarterly reports and the need to "make
the numbers" in their quarterly projections, performance based pay
(usually based on a "one size fits all" model for aligning managerial and
shareholder interests), the growth of boards filled with independent
directors less likely to defer to management and more likely to question
managerial strategies that appear unusual and not obviously share-valuemaximizing, institutional shareholders (and institutional shareholder
services) with good corporate governance templates that they apply
uniformly to firms seeking to adopt or reject various corporate
governance measures.238 The venture capitalists' incentives toward
conformity are about their reputation and the need to produce results as
good or better than competing firms.239
On the other hand, corporate managers and venture capitalists tend
to be dynamic and strong willed individuals with considerable
confidence in their own good judgment.240 While corporate law cannot
and should not create non-conformity of viewpoint where it does not
237

See Burstein, supra note 98, at 247-74.
See id. at 255-58. Theorists are just beginning to recognize the importance of
heterogeneity in both the sources of innovation and their commercialization. The Silicon
Valley venture capital model is not the norm in all innovative industries. See id. at 232-34
(describing differences between the way information is exchanged and contracting takes place
between biotech and large pharmaceutical firms, and the standard model derived from venture
capital contracts); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity Of
Technology, Organizational Structure, And Financial Contracting 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885,
888 (2010) (seeking to understand "why particular types of innovative activity take place in
different locations corresponding to different combinations of technology, the organizational
structure in which the technology is developed, and the financing mode.").
239
See supra Part I.B.
240
See Gilson, supra note 238, at 905.
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otherwise exist, corporate law can be helpful in reassuring large firm
managers and venture capitalists that should they choose to follow a
somewhat atypical investment strategy they will not be unduly punished
for it if the strategy fails. Many of the traditional features of corporate
and limited partnership law are designed to provide precisely such
assurance.241 The business judgment rule and the potential to opt out of
duty of care liability completely should protect most unusual investment
strategies.242
Yet one can easily imagine ex ante concerns by managers that they
will be second-guessed and subject to potential litigation if a
nonconforming investment strategy fails and costs the firm substantial
capital. Even if the chances of actually losing such a lawsuit are slim,
the very existence of such suits can be time consuming and
embarrassing, and it is not at all inconceivable that a lawsuit challenging
a controversial and unsuccessful investment strategy might at least
withstand a threshold motion, subjecting management and the firm to
burdensome discovery and settlement pressure. One possible way to
alleviate some of these concerns for corporate managements would be to
get an "innovation opinion letter" similar to the "fairness opinion" that
accompanies most M&A deals.243 Before embarking on a nonconforming investment strategy involving substantial capital, companies
might hire an outside "technology advisory firm" consisting perhaps of
scientists, patent lawyers, and semi-retired tech entrepreneurs, who
would investigate the proposal, write a report and determine that it was a
reasonable investment strategy in light of the current state of the
technology and law involved, and one that, if successful, had potential to
generate substantial value for the investor. Like fairness opinions, such
letters would provide further protection to managers and board members
facing an important business decision and would presumably receive

241
See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 411 (2013) (discussing the
business judgment rule). The business judgment rule is an example of traditional corporate
law that provides assurance because it is "a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Id.
242
See id.; see also J. Haskell Murray, "Latchkey Corporations": Fiduciary Duties in
Wholly Owned, Financially Troubled Subsidiaries, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 577, 617 (2011).
243
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Jacob J. Fedechko, The Role of Judicial
Opinions in Shaping M&A Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS (Claire Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., forthcoming) (discussing Smith
v. Van Gorkom and fairness opinions); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 1557, 1563-67 (2006) (discussing the purpose of fairness opinions and how fairness
opinions alleviate liability concerns).
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substantial deference by the courts in any subsequent lawsuit challenging
such investment decisions.244
Perhaps greater than the fear of litigation, however, is a managers'
or venture capitalists' fear of adverse business or personal consequences
if a nonconforming investment strategy fails.245 Failed investments lead
to reputational loss, lower stock prices, difficulties raising new capital,
takeover threats, and shareholder challenges of various sorts.246 This is
where the enabling features of corporate law become important,
permitting companies to opt into corporate structures that insulate
management from the more immediate effects of shareholder
disapproval—structures like dual class stock and staggered boards.247 As
previously noted, such structures are highly controversial because they
can just as easily protect managerial misconduct as managerial
nonconformity.248 Yet, in this area, there is at least some empirical work
that suggests that these protective measures may be value-enhancing for
a least some subset of firms in technology fields.249 Such studies provide
some support for an individualized case-by-case approach to evaluating
244
Id. at 1599-1602 (discussing how Delaware courts frequently state that fairness
opinions are not necessary yet look "to these opinions as a substantive determinator that can
guide them in their own fairness determinations" and remain "resolutely confident in the worth
of the valuation processes underlying a fairness opinion").
245
Gregory Todd Jones, Trust, Institutionalization, & Corporate Reputations: Public
Independent Fact-Finding From a Risk Management Perspective, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
121, 135-36 (2005) (discussing how reputation and trust are more effective than law and
regulation "to constrain the way that people, and the corporations that they manage, behave").
246
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, REPUTATION: RISK OF RISKS 2, 4, 7, 9 (2005)
(discussing how failure or a perception of failure can lead to reputation loss resulting in a
domino effect on investors and other sources of financial gain).
247
Larry Page, co-founder of Google, one of the leading technology firms to adopt a
dual class structure, said, "A management team distracted by a series of short-term targets is as
pointless as a dieter stepping on a scale every half hour." Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Letter
from the Founders—"An Owner's Manual" for Google's Shareholders, Google Inc.,
Registration Statement (Form S-1) at ii (Apr. 29, 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/HZG5CWWY. It should be noted that the limited partnership structures of venture capital firm (as
well as capital lock-in features) give their general partners much of the same protections as
dual class preferred. See Elizabeth S. Miller, Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner
Liability Protection and Piercing the Veil of Texas Business Entities, 43 TEX. BUS. L. 405, 406
(2009) ("A corporation is well-recognized for its complete liability shield."); Claudia H. Allen,
Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 793 (2009);
Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 891, 896 (2006).
248
See Weill, supra note 247, at 915; Tian Wen, You Can't Sell Your Firm and Own It
Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock Companies From Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1497-1500 (2014) (discussing the issue of oversight in companies with
dual-class stock).
249
See Christopher C. McKinnon, Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical
& Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, 5 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 81, 82, 90-91
(2015); Wen, supra note 248, at 1510.
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such measures, with a careful consideration of what, if any, presumptions
should apply in any particular case.250
Dual class stock arrangements, in which management retains
majority voting control while giving up substantial rights to cash flow,
has often been considered the ultimate form of managerial protection
from second guessing by public shareholders.251 Such arrangements are
not particularly rare. In a recent study, 6% of all publicly traded U.S.
companies were found to have more than one class of common stock,252
a structure said to make them "virtually immune to a hostile takeover."253
Studies of the overall effects of such dual class structures on firm value
are mixed.254 While some cross sectional studies have shown diminished
firm value is related to separation of voting rights from cash flow
rights,255 other studies have found that announcements of dual class stock
recapitalizations are associated with positive abnormal returns.256
Commentators stress the "endogenous" nature of the decision to utilize
dual class shares.257 That is, management may prefer dual class shares
for many different reasons, some beneficial to long-term value and some
injurious to it.258 The role of dual class shares in encouraging
nonconformity of investment perspectives, however, seems much clearer.
Many scholars agree it provides both legal and psychological insulation
from shareholder pressure.259
Indeed, it may well be that for some managers the adoption of a
dual class structure is a way of announcing their nonconformity and faith
in their own good judgment.260 While such beliefs in one's own genius
250

See McKinnon, supra note 249, at 90-91. A majority of studies have found dualclass stock negatively impacting the firm, while others show positive effects. Id. The larger
the difference between control and cash-flow rights, the lower the value of the firm. Id. Paul
A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United
States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084 (2010) (finding that "firm value is positively associated
with insiders' cash-flow rights and negatively associated with insiders' voting rights, and
negatively associated with the wedge between the two").
251
McKinnon, supra note 249, at 81-82.
252
Gompers et al., supra note 250, at 1052.
253
Id.
254
Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence,
12 REV. FIN. 51 (2008).
255
Gompers et al., supra note 250, at 1084.
256
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 254.
257
Bradford D. Jordan et al., Growth Opportunities, Short-Term Market Pressure, and
Dual-Class Share Structure 4 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2474645 (short-term market pressure increases after share unifications).
258
See McKinnon, supra note 249, at 83 (using an acquisition in a dual class firm as an
example of a transaction ripe for managerial self-dealing, resulting in either potential longterm value or disaster); Jordan et al., supra note 257, at 2.
259
See e.g., Jordan et al., supra note 257, at 24.
260
See, e.g., Page & Brin, supra note 247, at i, iii.
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may frequently turn out to be self-serving and exaggerated, any legal
regime which seeks to promote nonconformity of investor perspectives
must at least be extremely wary of "one-size-fits-all" proposals to ban all
dual class structures.261
Nonconforming investors in innovation who cannot or do not want
to utilize the dual class structure may seek the more limited but still
substantial insulation of the staggered board.262 This is another
institution that studies have shown, on average, does more harm than
good to shareholder value.263 Some recent studies, however, suggest that
with respect to investments in innovation, the protection against
shareholder interference offered by the staggered board may have some
beneficial effects.264 A corporate law which sought to encourage
261
There is a history of such attempts at blanket prohibitions of dual class structures.
The SEC sought to ban them from public exchanges by promulgating Rule 9c-4, 17 C.F.R. §
240.19c-4(a) (1989). That Rule, issued in response to the New York Stock Exchange's 1986
decision to begin listing dual class shares, was subsequently held to have exceeded SEC
authority. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). More recently,
important institutional investors like CalPERS have announced that they are considering
blanket campaigns to remove dual class structures from any publicly traded companies. See
Shanny Basar, CalPERS Sets Sights on Dual-Class Stock Structures, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20,
2012), http://online.wsj.com; Press Release, Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., Calls for
Elimination of Dual-Class Capital Structure to Enable All Shareholders to Hold Board of
Directors and Management Accountable for Company's Performance, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr.
18, 2006), available at http://www.businesswire.com.
262
Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 2 (June 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), archived at https://perma.cc/5YKQ-TP4Y; Weili Ge et al., Board
Destaggering: Corporate Governance Out of Focus? 1 (AAA 2014 Mgmt. Accounting
Section, Meeting Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2312565.
263
See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Delaware's Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 19 & n.91
(2014); Weill, supra note 247, at 898 n.25 (citing Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 211, at 410).
264
In December 2014, Daniel Gallagher, a sitting Commissioner of the SEC, and
Professor Joseph Grundfest released a paper arguing that the Harvard Shareholder Rights
Project's statements in support of various "de-staggering" proposals violated federal securities
laws. Daniel M Gallagher & Joseph Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?
The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors 3-5 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 199, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2536586. Gallagher and Grundfest's main argument was that Harvard omitted any reference to
a "larger body" of "far more substantial" academic research which contradicted Harvard's
position. Id. at 3. This "omitted research" consisted primarily of five recent papers, some of
which had not yet formally appeared in journals but all of which were available on the
Internet. See Cremers et al., supra note 262; Weili Ge et al., supra note 262; William C.
Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117
J. FIN. ECON. 307 (2015); Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of
Classified Boards on Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993 (2013); Augustine Duru et al.,
Staggered Boards, Corporate Opacity and Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 341 (2013).
Discounting Gallagher and Grundfest's somewhat dubious claim of securities violations, their
paper can be seen as an attempt to focus attention on a set of new and very interesting
empirical studies. These new studies do not actually refute the Harvard cited studies, but
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nonconformity in innovation investment would at least ensure that such
structures were potentially available to managers and firms who could
explain and defend their use of such structures based on the particular
circumstances of each individual firm. Such justifications could be
considered both by courts and institutional shareholders on a case-bycase basis.
The final difficulty in encouraging greater investment in
innovation is the most intractable of all. It is the fact, frequently alluded
to but rarely confronted directly, that expanding investment in
innovation, particularly in the way Mazzucato seeks to do, is effectively
asking investors to make a larger number of bad investments.265
Mazzucato wants firms to invest in innovation at an earlier stage in the
commercialization process, before the commercial viability of the
innovation can be reliably evaluated.266 She wants investors to accept a
longer time horizon before they receive return on their investment, and
she wants them to accept lower profits.267 It is hard to see how changes
in corporate law could encourage such extraordinary changes in investor
behavior. Yet the fact is that while it might seem bizarre at first to ask
capitalists to reduce their profit motive, they do so all the time through
various philanthropic and altruistic endeavors.268 There is no reason why
expenditures for philanthropy cannot be considered investments of a sort,
with returns that consist partially of financial returns (i.e. tax deductions)
but primarily provide non-monetary benefits.269
The motivations of angel investors, as described by many analysts,
involve precisely such mixed profitmaking and philanthropic motives.
They are "[f]amily and friends [who] have confidence in the innovator[s]
rather provide more detailed and nuanced information about the use and effects of staggered
boards on specific types of companies. For example, Cremers, Litov, and Sepe find that there
is a "significantly stronger" positive association between the adoption of a staggered board and
firm value for firms with higher R&D expenses as a fraction of their revenue, among firms
with more intangible assets, among firms that are more successful in innovation (as measured
by their patent citation counts) and among firms with larger size. Cremers et al., supra note
262, at 7. Data from Weili Ge, Tanlu and Zhang show that "investment in R&D decreases
after the decision to destagger" in a manner "consistent with the reduced incentive horizon for
directors following destaggering. Weili Ge et al., supra note 262, at 4. Duru, Wang and Zhao
find an "increasingly positive association between staggered boards and firm value as opacity
increases" and that relation is "partly the outcome of the increasingly positive association
between staggered boards and R&D investments as opacity increases." Duru et al., supra, at
350.
265
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 69, 186-87.
266
Id. at 186-87.
267
Id.
268
See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437,
2438 (2009) (discussing Google.org and its for-profit philanthropy model).
269
See id.
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. . . so they invest without fully understanding the innovation's market
value"270 Many invest for "nonfinancial as well as financial reasons, and,
in fact, many angels do have personal reasons for investment."271 Most
angels are successful ex-entrepreneurs who miss the excitement of new
venture development or wish to give back to the entrepreneurial
community through "for-profit philanthropy."272 They operate through a
personal "network of trust" generally in their own geographic area.273 To
be sure, the trend in angel investing seems to be toward greater
professionalization and the formation of angel-investor groups to pool
investment capital and utilize greater expertise in the selection of
investments.274 Yet there appear to be many individuals who, like the
State as Mazzucato describes it, are willing to invest in innovation for a
variety of motives, of which profit maximization may not be the most
important.275
In addition to motive, the techniques of traditional angel investing
also resemble in many ways the characteristics Mazzucato describes as
belonging to State investments in innovation.276 Angel investors tend to
be patient, with longer time horizons than those of venture capitalists.277
They also tend to specialize in investments of particular interest to them,
defined by the particular industry or product involved, or the geographic
area affected, or both. They tend to provide innovators with some level
of technical support and counseling, but do not seek actual control or
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See Ibrahim, supra note 133, at 1408.
272
Id. at 1409.
273
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending For Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 131 (2010).
274
Id. at 129, 131-32.
275
Similarly, consider Joan Heminway's description of the motives of crowdfunders in
what she calls, "unequity," investments in companies that offer some possibility of a payment,
but no control and no equity. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment
Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that
Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L. J. 865, 878 (2013-14):
[T]he typical unequity offering is not intended to (and may not) result in
pecuniary gain to the investor. Rather, the gain comes in part from financial
return and in part from other return, often in the form of a tangible reward
(i.e., a good or service) or altruism (e.g., for social enterprise investments or
for funding the little guy with the creative idea who otherwise would not be
able to execute on his idea), happiness or pride (e.g., by developing a two-way
relationship with an entrepreneur—being able to say that you contributed to
and received proceeds from a startup's business), or other emotional
satisfaction.
276
MAZZUCATO, supra note 2, at 10.
277
Ibrahim, supra note 133, at 1416-18.
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veto power over operations in the way many venture capitalists do.278
And, as we have seen, like the government investors described by
Mazzucato, they are at least as motivated by desire to see innovation
itself and the social benefits it can bring to their community and the
broader society as they are in making a profit.279 They are, in short, at
least amenable to the prospect of making some number of the right kind
of "bad investments."280
To be sure, there seem to be at least two trends occurring currently
in the world of angel investing. One is an increase in professionalization,
with an increased use of angel groups, many of which have professional
managers and seek a more rigorous and informed approach to early stage
investments in innovation.281 At the same time, largely through the
Internet and the institution of crowdfunding, there is also an increased
interest in innovation investment by large numbers of people with a mix
of profit making and alternative motives.282
Ideally, both these trends will have a positive effect on the state of
innovation investing. The professionalized, informed and sophisticated
investors of the new angel groups will find ways to evaluate and
profitably invest in innovations that had previously been overlooked by
the more narrow investment criteria of the traditional venture capitalists.
At the same time, new (and perhaps some of the old) angel type investors
will be willing to expand the pool of capital available to invest in the
"questionable" to "bad" investments that cannot be justified on the basis
of profit alone, motivated by friendship, curiosity, and a desire to
promote beneficial change.
There is one potential corporate law problem standing in the way
of a large expansion in the investment capital available for such mixed
motive investing: the doctrine of fiduciary duty.283 Angel investors have
traditionally preferred to invest their own money, and one of the primary
reasons given has been their desire to avoid the complications,
obligations, and problems they would have if they assumed fiduciary
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duties in investing other people's money.284 But recent corporate law
developments actually provide a very convenient answer to this problem
in the form of the "public benefit corporation."285 The managers of such
corporations are expressly authorized to "balance" the "stockholders'
pecuniary interests," with two other factors: (1) "the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation's conduct,"286 and (2) "the
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation."287 The Delaware statute provides managers with even
greater protection against potential breach of fiduciary duty claims than
those provided to ordinary for-profit companies under Delaware law.288
Such corporations could turn out to be very useful vehicles for
investors who wish to support various types of innovative enterprises
under the guidance and direction of the kind of experienced
entrepreneurs who make up a large portion of angel investors. Freeing
them of many of the concerns that go with traditional fiduciary duties
(while simultaneously committing them to a public-benefit motive)
might make such entrepreneurs more willing to expand their capital
pools by seeking out such investors.289
III. CONCLUSION
Amid growing concerns about the slowing pace of innovation and
its deleterious effects on economic growth,290 Professor Mazzucato's
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account of the State's role in the most important innovations in recent
history should cause us to think more broadly and creatively about where
real innovation comes from and how it can be encouraged. Such
thoughts can lead those of us who are corporate lawyers to new
perspectives and revised judgments concerning critical policy questions
in our own field. It might even lead to more innovation.

Six Headwinds (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 18315, 2012), archived at
https://perma.cc/JW3Z-LGXH.

